The Deutsche Bahn holding, DB Cargo’s parent company, published its annual report for 2025 last week: a good occasion to dive deeper into the circumstances at its freight subsidiary. Things are looking better, but not exactly rock solid. Further restructuring changes could provide the needed push to get DB Cargo back on track.

DB Cargo’s restructuring proceedings, which started in 2022, are not immediately visible when looking at the company’s basic financial indicator: revenue. Note that this number includes data from all of DB Cargo’s subsidiaries, including outside of Germany. Revenue has remained relatively stable, hovering between 4.5 billion and 5.5 billion euros since 2017.

EBIT is more ‘all over the place’

How different does that picture look when looking at Earning before Interest and Taxes (EBIT). EBIT is an indicator of operating performance, but does not yet include expenses such as taxes and interest payments. DB Cargo has not achieved a positive EBIT during any of the assessed years, with lows recorded during the pandemic years. In other words, the company’s operations are fundamentally unprofitable.

This is underscored by the operator’s performance figures. During the pandemic, DB Cargo broke the downward volume and operational performance trends. It transported more freight and did more transport work in terms of tonne-kilometres. Despite that, the finances were worse than ever. The more the company transported, the more money it lost.

That is clearly not a good sign for a rail freight operator – especially when it can no longer count on money transfer from its parent company Deutsche Bahn. But for all the criticism that DB Cargo has received, there has been a turnaround in 2022 in the company’s financial performance.

When looking at the EBIT figures, there is a clear change starting in that year. Since then, DB Cargo has only recorded year-on-year improvements on EBIT. In 2025, the operator came very close to operational profit at -7 million euros. There are various reasons for this, and there are also reasons to think that this may continue into the future.

Subsidies contribute most

The main windfall, which cannot directly be ascribed to sound business management or a restructuring, came in the shape of subsidies. Germany approved a 300 million-euro subsidy for single wagonload (SWL) traffic in 2024. DB Cargo received 163 million euros from those funds, which are also reflected in the EBIT figures. Moreover, DB Cargo received millions in track access charge (TAC) subsidies. In 2025, federal subsidies totalled 305 million euros (195 million for SWL, 78 for TAC, 32 for investments).

Additional federal funding has clearly helped DB Cargo to substantially improve its operational result. This, of course, is not necessarily a solid long-term plan. In order to continue cutting costs, the freight operator has put several plans on the table. These pertain to some of the biggest expenditures: personnel, maintenance and unprofitable contracts.

Halving the workforce

DB Cargo is planning a massive workforce reduction of over 6,000 employees. That would shrink the size of the workforce (in Germany) by around 50%. Across Europe, DB Cargo has over 25,000 employees. Terminations have helped to save 149 million euros on personnel costs in 2025.

The company has also been ending unprofitable contracts. This deliberately shrinks the company’s business, while improving operational performance. It has also sold the intermodal business of its subsidiary Transfesa.

This is reflected in the rolling stock fleet of the operator. Its size is shrinking, and has been shrinking consistently for a couple of years. Simultaneously, DB Cargo has sold 60 locomotives to Beacon Rail and around 6,000 wagons to GATX in sale-and-leaseback agreements. The share of leased and rented wagons in the overall wagon fleet has seen an uptick in 2025 – despite volumes declining.

The increase in the share of leased and rented wagons during the pandemic years coincided with a growth in volume. That is not the case now. If DB Cargo continues to pursue this path of operational flexibility, its owned wagon fleet could keep shrinking in size.

As a result, the provision of locomotives and wagons should become more flexible. This creates financial flexibility as well – DB Cargo won’t need to pay for their maintenance. The operator also gained 300 million euros from the sale.

Together, the termination of unprofitable contracts, reduction in volume and decline in maintenance costs (along with some other things) helped to shrink material costs by 292 million euros, DB said.

Will it be enough?

The DB restructuring proceedings will continue going forward. Decentralisation in several business units that have their own rolling stock and personnel at their disposal should help improve operational efficiency. Further workforce reductions, bonuses for long-haul drives for train drivers and far-reaching SWL remodelling (going to four central shunting hubs) should also aid financial performance.

DB Cargo will need to “clarify details” on its restructuring plan in the summer of 2026. Only then, gradual implementation of the newly proposed plan will begin. With -7 million euros in EBIT in 2025, the company is close to achieving a positive operational performance. However, its net financial result was around minus 40-60 million euros, according to CEO Bernhard Osburg. There is some way to go to profitability by the end of the year.

Amid the rail freight industry’s hiccups, it is the private companies that remain stable. State-owned operators are failing to secure a spot on the scene.

Take a look, for example, at the graphs below. In 2021, incumbents (the dominant rail freight company in a country, often state-owned) lost their majority market share Europe-wide. Challengers (either private market entrants or foreign incumbents) are taking over. This trend has been ongoing for a long time already.

From 95% to 49%

A case in point is Germany. The Federal Network Agency has collected data on rail freight market shares since 2002. At the start of data collection, state-owned DB Cargo was the undisputed market leader. By 2024, the picture looked much different. Challengers held a majority market share of 61%.

This trend is not expected to reverse anytime soon. Domestic incumbents across Europe, notably DB Cargo and Hexafret, have had to reduce their activities due to EU Competition Law rulings. Moreover, the Polish national incumbent PKP Cargo is still in restructuring proceedings, which could therefore also give way to other market participants. However, the latter has had some success, growing its market share by over a percentage point in August 2025 compared to July.

The higher degree of flexibility among private companies may prove to be a decisive factor in market development. The rail freight market is moving away from traditional goods, such as bulk, towards intermodal traffic. This is also where private operator PCC Intermodal takes the largest share in Poland, for example. It beats PKP Cargo and the foreign challenger DB Cargo Polska.

Medway’s headway

The rise of vertically integrated private logistics companies may further send the public operators into retreat. A dramatic example of this is the takeover of Portugal’s state-owned rail freight operator, CP Carga. In 2016, MSC acquired the company and rebranded it as Medway.

Now, Medway is making a headway into Spain as well. State-owned Renfe Mercancías is getting rid of the majority of its freight operations by setting up a joint venture with the MSC subsidiary. Within a decade, the lion’s share of freight operations have gone private on the Iberian peninsula.

Renfe Mercancías is expected to continue operating strategic services, but will transfer its steel, intermodal and “multi-product” services to the joint venture. Similarly, Romania opted to establish a new rail freight operator after the bankruptcy of CFR Marfă. It followed a similar logic, saying that it needs a public operator for strategic operations.

Rail freight will not be the same

The future of public operators may be just that: dedicated to non-commercial but strategic work, such as single wagonload operations. It may not be, or end up somewhere ‘in between’. For example, DB Cargo’s restructuring plan seeks to position the operator for commercially viable international operations, like intermodal. At the same time, it wants to continue offering single wagonload services, albeit at fewer shunting yards than it does now.

Clearly, the role of state-owned operators is changing. Private companies are proving to be more competitive. Whether or not there is a role for the state incumbents in future commercial operations? That remains to be seen.

Wagon owners association UIP shared their analysis of the Swiss and European (JNS) approaches with RailFreight.com, so let’s take a closer look at their findings.

It immediately becomes clear that Switzerland has opted for a less nuanced direction. Bern has chosen to reclassify all tread-braked wheelsets as non-thermostable, regardless of design or performance. By contrast, the JNS only targets specific wheelset types that carry proven risks.

This, according to UIP, allows maintenance resources to be concentrated at the vulnerable wheelsets. The Swiss approach, the association says, disregards established technical standards and creates an additional operational burden and maintenance requirements. The safety benefit of this is questionable.

Wheel diameter

A second important regulatory change concerns the minimum required wheel diameter. A larger diameter should lead to more robust wheels. Here too, Switzerland takes a different approach than the JNS.

Switzerland requires many types of wheelsets to have an increased diameter of 864 millimetres, even if they have no history of failure. It also only looks at the nominal axle load at moments of failure, without considering the prior operational life of a wheelset.. The JNS, by contrast, only requires this when there is a documented history of failure that indicates a risk based on a scientific assessment.

The FOT approach “results in the premature withdrawal of functional wheels and reduces wagon availability”, says UIP. Perfectly safe and functional wheels would have to be replaced.

Inspections and monitoring

UIP also compared the approaches to inspections and monitoring. Switzerland opts for distance-based inspection requirements. This, however, “does not take into account that wagons already undergo maintenance interventions at predictable as well as unscheduled intervals, during which wheelsets are inspected”, says UIP.

The system would lead to thousands of additional dedicated workshop visits. Yet, they would not specifically target the highest-risk wheelsets. This threatens overwhelming workshop capacity in Europe, according to UIP.

“Given Switzerland’s central role in Europe’s north–south freight corridors, this additional workshop demand could affect the availability of wagons used in international traffic. This may have implications for cross-border freight flows such as intermodal traffic between North Sea ports and Italy, chemicals transport and other bulk commodities transiting the Swiss network.”

UIP evidently prefers the JNS approach. It is said to achieve comparable safety outcomes by integrating inspections into existing maintenance workflows. It strengthens safety while maintaining operational feasibility.

Deadlines and timeline

The FOT and JNS also diverge when it comes to implementation deadlines. Initially, the Swiss FOT demanded full implementation by 31 December 2025. This was met by much dismay on the part of the rail freight industry. Switzerland later extended some deadlines to late 2026.

UIP looks much more favourably upon the JNS framework, which establishes differentiated timelines matched to the complexity of each measure. “Immediate action is required where urgently needed (e.g. thermo-stability reclassification) while structural changes affecting large parts of the fleet are phased in until 2027 and 2029. The JNS framework also strengthens the crucial role of ECM certification bodies to assess the implementation of the measures in their ECM audits”, explains UIP.

For 2025, following the Covid-19 pandemic and the high inflation rates of recent years, freight operators were expecting to face a track charge increase of 21.25%, for an average amount of 1.746 euros per kilometre. Such a rise would damage rail competitiveness against road transport, which benefited from the end of toll charges on around 1000 kilometres of highways.

Portuguese freight train operators complained, and AMT intervened, analysing the track access structure and proposing initiatives to make rail transport (at least) as competitive as truck service. Minimum access package variations barely influence passenger companies, since their operators are under public service contracts (CP – Comboios de Portugal) or public-private partnerships (Fertagus). In this segment, the only exception is CP’s Alfa Pendular, run with Pendolino trains and considered a commercial service, without subsidies.

Lower increases

After the policy intervention, freight operators will face a track charge increase of 2.4% in 2025, the same inflation rate forecasted by the Government. On average, the freight access charge will rise from 1.44 to 1.47 euros. For the period 2026-2028, AMT recommended a Compound Annual Growth Rate of 12.33%, with average access charges of 1.66 euros, 1.86 euros and 2.09 euros in 2026, 2027 and 2028, respectively.

Lower increases are combined with a government subsidy of 9 million euros every year until 2028, under the green mobility package. Nevertheless, the smoother track access surge and the government subsidy are “lower than the amount paid by the operators to the infrastructure manager”, as AMT recognises in a recently published report. Without intervention, freight operators would face a track charge surge of 6.93% in 2026, 6.37% in 2027 and 5.49% in 2028. On average, that would cost 1.867 euros in 2026, 1.1986 in 2027 euros and 2.095 euros in 2028.

Compensation incoming

This governmental initiative will reduce IP’s revenues by around 5.1 million euros compared to the case base scenario. The state is required to compensate for this amount, which is fundamental to fund the conservation and maintenance of the Portuguese rail network. Access track charges represent the majority of IP’s own revenues for rail network management.

If there was no initiative, “there would be a risk of creating a negative incentive to reduce the maintenance requirement to lower costs for operators”, warns AMT. The better the rail track condition, the more willing operators are to use trains to carry goods, with positive impacts on IP’s budget. For this reason, AMT introduced an efficiency criterion to improve network investments in the proposal to update track charges.

Addendum and doubts

AMT recommendations were followed by IP, which published an addendum to the network statements between 2025 and 2027. TAC were the only change between the original and addendum versions. The AMT’s report is based on a moderated growth scenario for the freight market, following the “reopening of the Beira Alta line (North International Corridor) in 2025 and the beginning of the operations in the rail track between Évora and Caia (South International Corridor, probably in 2025 and certainly in 2026”.

However, the reality is different between the two links. In Beira Alta, freight operators excluded the possibility of riding 750-metre-long trains in this TEN-T corridor, fully reopened in September 2025, because route gradients were not intervened: this means that long freight trains would require two locomotives, eliminating the reduction of costs expected. Between Évora and Caia (next to the Spanish border), the new 90-kilometre rail track is not expected to open before the beginning of 2027, after the certification process.

The problems with both TEN-T corridors might compromise AMT’s plan. This question was raised by APEF, the association that represents Portuguese freight operators. The Mobility authority claims that “the billions of euros invested in the network modernisation will certainly have a positive and relevant impact on the system’s sustainability and competitiveness, particularly in the freight rail transport”.

The Hamburg port achieved a 7.3% growth in the container segment in 2025 – much more than Rotterdam (+3.1%) and Antwerp (+0.7%).

TEU versus tonnes

Container growth in Hamburg distinguishes itself even more from Rotterdam when taking volumes into consideration. Yes, there was growth in Rotterdam in terms of TEU, but the tonnage metric fell by 0.2%. “More import containers, lower export volumes due to the weakened European competitiveness, and the decline in transhipment led to increased transhipment of empty containers”, says the Rotterdam port.

By contrast, Hamburg achieved growth in tonnages too – by no less than 4.6%. While the port did not disclose its container tonnage figure for 2025, it likely sits at around 81 million tonnes. Antwerp and Rotterdam still lead the way in Europe with 149.5 and 133.2 million tonnes respectively.

Where does Hamburg’s growth come from? It was Asian exporters in particular that reached Hamburg more and more often. At the same time, policymakers in the White House severely damaged the transatlantic business with their tariffs.

It is doubtful that the rail freight industry will take a similarly positive view on the matter. Despite Europe’s modal shift goals, the road sector captured a bigger share of the pie in 2024. Its freight volume grew by 5.2% to 1,110.5 million tonnes.

Rail wins internationally…

Rail freight is already known to be mostly about international flows of goods, and the Italian strongly confirm this. Let’s take a look at domestic freight first: trucks transported 1,084,249 tonnes of goods in Italy in 2024. By contrast, trains only managed 35,706 tonnes, a tiny fraction of the road sector.

Internationally, the picture looks much different. Here, the road sector moved 26,243 tonnes. Rail freight transported more than double that: 58,898 tonnes.

Clearly, international traffic is vital for Italian rail freight. For large railway companies (as per the definition used by Istat), international transport accounts for 64.6% of their total activity.

… but trucks still take the performance prize

A small ‘sobering’ remark must be made here, however: trucks still outperformed trains internationally when measuring their activity in tonne-kilometres. In raw tonnage, rail does better, but trucks transport their goods over longer distances.

The Italian data also confirm the importance of intermodal business. Among the types of goods transported, the “other” category accounts for 59% in tonnes and 49% in tonne-kilometres. This includes containers and swap bodies.

Metals and agricultural products, hunting and forestry also grew their volumes in 2024. The former increased by 6% in terms of tonnes of 8.6% in terms of tonne-kilometres. The latter grew by a modest 1.5%, but tonne-kilometres saw a positive +18.2% dynamic, which indicates an increase in the average transport distances for these products.

The Maxmodal Silk Road Index (MSRI) edged up to 11,317 for 20-foot containers in January 2026, a 0.4% month-on-month increase, signalling consolidation across Eurasian rail corridors. Over the same period, the Maxmodal Suez Canal Index (MSCI) rose more sharply to 3,258, up 4.93%, driven predominantly by higher deep-sea rates. As a result, the MSRI–MSCI spread narrowed to 8,059, from 8,166 in December.

For rail freight stakeholders, the message is twofold: overland pricing remains structurally stable, but ocean volatility is once again influencing corridor competitiveness.

Rail market: stability with corridor nuances

January’s modest MSRI increase (+0.40% for 20’, +0.41% for 40’) reflected rail-driven dynamics rather than a structural repricing. Growth was concentrated in inland China and cross-border segments, particularly the Xi’an–border and Caspian-linked legs. By contrast, Black Sea maritime components softened.

Two eastern macro-regions accounted for the bulk of the increase. Xi’an–China Border contributed 36.8% of index growth, while China Border–Caspian added 30.9%. The Black Sea–Central Europe leg added 20.6%, and the Caspian Sea segment 14.0%. The Black Sea region itself declined by 10.3%, partly reflecting reliability concerns ahead of the announced German train drivers’ strike between 24 and 29 January.

Operational developments underpinned early-month momentum. The first cross-Caspian freight train of the year departed from Xi’an via Horgos–Altynkol, while China–Europe departures intensified across the Greater Bay Area. At the same time, winter-related constraints and infrastructure works in Germany tightened effective capacity into Duisburg toward month-end.

In cost terms, the Middle Corridor retained a clear advantage. Although the spread between the Middle and South corridors widened by 0.51% month on month, as the South Corridor rose 0.42% compared to 0.39% on the Middle, the structural cost base remains lower on the Middle Corridor (10,228 versus 13,494).

Route rankings were unchanged. The most competitive options from Shanghai, Qingdao, and Guangzhou to Duisburg were those via Dostyk or Altynkol, via Poti or Constanța, offering a cost advantage of up to 26–27% compared to Kashgar routings.

Caspian bottleneck persists

While inland rail legs firmed modestly, the Caspian Sea segment continued to face structural constraints. Freight rates on Aktau–Alat and Turkmenbashi–Alat rose by around 0.8% month on month, reflecting winter operating windows and vessel scarcity. However, volumes fell by approximately 3.5%, underlining that operational bottlenecks – rather than demand weakness – remain the key limiting factor.

Handling tariffs across Aktau and Turkmenbashi were unchanged, reinforcing the report’s conclusion that January dynamics were driven by utilisation and reliability, not price inflation.

Further west, Black Sea short-sea rates from Poti declined by around 0.9%, while volumes eased by 1–2%. Competitive pressure from Asia–Mediterranean deep-sea routing capped upside potential in the region.

Ocean rebound narrows the gap

By contrast, January was clearly ocean-led on the Suez corridor. The MSCI rose 4.93% for 20-foot and 5.51% for 40-foot containers, with the deep-sea leg accounting for 91.1% of the total index increase.

The strongest contributions came from the South and East China load ports to the North Range. Shenzhen–Hamburg, Shanghai–Hamburg, and Shanghai–Antwerp and Rotterdam all recorded high single-digit percentage increases, confirming synchronised rate pressure across Asia–North Europe lanes.

Inland European legs played a secondary role. Port-to-Duisburg transfers became more expensive amid congestion, winter disruption and strike risk, but volumes declined as reliability tightened. Duisburg’s own handling charges remained flat, while volumes slipped by around 2% month on month.

The result was a narrowing of the rail–sea spread, not because rail became cheaper, but because ocean rates firmed more decisively.

February outlook: holiday drag expected

Looking ahead, the Lunar New Year is expected to weigh on volumes. Factory shutdowns and reduced export activity are likely to translate into softer spot pricing in February, only partially offset by carrier capacity discipline.

For Eurasian rail freight, January’s data confirm a market in consolidation. Overland corridors remain operationally resilient despite bottlenecks and strike-related disruptions. However, the relative competitiveness of rail versus sea continues to depend heavily on deep-sea pricing cycles – a reminder that modal shift ambitions remain intertwined with maritime market volatility.

The total rail freight volume in the Netherlands in 2025 amounted to 38.1 million tonnes. This includes imports, exports, domestic and transit traffic and is a 4% (-1.6 million tonnes) decline compared to 2024.

In similar fashion to 2023 and 2024, the volume of coal has shrunk significantly. In 2024, 5 million tonnes of coal were transported on the Dutch rail network. Last year, this number fell by another 30% to 3.5 million tonnes. The huge impact of this trend on the overall volume is clear: the decrease in coal transportation of 1.5 million tonnes covers the vast majority of the total decline of 1.6 million tonnes.

Likewise, the volume of liquid bulk contracted by 0.3 million tonnes (-5%). Breakbulk and dry bulk both fell by around 0.1 million tonnes.

Intermodal stands, but does it stand strong?

By contrast, the intermodal segment has grown slightly, from 17.9 million tonnes in 2024 to 18.2 million tonnes in 2025. That is a cautiously positive development. As rail freight loses volumes in traditional segments, the intermodal sector provides new business opportunities.

However, as ProRail points out, intermodal is not risk-free. It is partially dependent on world trade. The inflow of containers in, for instance, the Port of Rotterdam rises when trade barriers are low and vice versa. Intermodal is also sensitive to supply chain disruptions, such as the inaccessibility of the Suez Canal or container shortages. Lastly, the competitiveness of rail compared with other modes of transport plays an important role in the size of intermodal rail.

A notable development concerns the growing popularity of the “rocktainer ore”: iron ore transported in intermodal loading units. At the same time, ProRail records a decline in ore transportation in conventional loading units, indicating a shift from one type of loading unit to another. The total volume transported in ILUs increased by 4% to 21.7 million tonnes. They now account for a 57% share of the entire rail freight volume.

Single wagonload on the decline

It appears that single wagonload (SWL) operations in the Netherlands are subject to some of the same pressures as elsewhere in Europe. SWL accounts for around half of the decline in the number of freight trains that cross the border with Germany. In total, 2,050 fewer trains crossed the border in 2025 compared to 2024. An important cause of this development is the switch from SWL trains to block trains, says ProRail.

Block trains are cheaper and faster for shippers, who are now choosing to send entire trains less frequently as opposed to a couple of wagons every day. The consequence is that SWL services operate with lower frequencies or are cancelled altogether, the Dutch infrastructure manager explains.

Regarding total TEUs, the port handled 934,000 compared to the 902,000 of 2024, a year-on-year increase of 4% and also the highest value in the history of the port. Ro-Ro operations remained stable, with 525,000 units moved in 2025 and 524,000 in 2024. The only decreases recorded at the port of Gothenburg concerned the number of new cars moved (251,000 vs 257,000) and the production of energy (20.7 million tonnes in 2025 vs 21.8 in 2024).

The Maxmodal Silk Road Index (MSRI) for 20-foot containers rose from 11,180 to 11,271 in December, reflecting sustained year-end cost pressure across Eurasian rail and multimodal corridors. Over the same period, the Maxmodal Suez Canal Index (MSCI) climbed to 3,105, driven primarily by higher deep-sea freight rates and a series of operational disruptions affecting European on-carriage.

As a result, the spread between the two indexes narrowed to 8,166 points, down from 8,223 in November. According to Maxmodal, this compression reflects a faster month-on-month increase in deep-sea–related costs rather than any structural improvement in the competitiveness of maritime routes. Early January indicators already point to easing pressure, as container rates on Asia–Europe sea lanes began to soften at the start of 2026.

Rail corridors remain under broad-based pressure

Rail-based Silk Road costs continued their gradual upward trend in December. The MSRI increased by 0.82% month-on-month for 20-foot containers and by 0.77% for 40-foot units, pointing to persistent cost pressure across multiple corridors rather than a single regional bottleneck.

Both the Middle Corridor and the South Corridor recorded positive dynamics. The Middle Corridor index increased by 0.9% for 20-foot containers, while the South Corridor rose by 0.7%. This resulted in a slight narrowing of the price spread between the two routes to 3,249 index points, equivalent to a 0.1% month-on-month contraction.

Despite these movements, Silk Road route rankings remained broadly unchanged. The most competitive routings continued to run via the Kazakhstan border crossings at Dostyk and Altynkol, combined with Black Sea access through Poti and Constanța. These routes retained a cost advantage of up to 26–27% compared with alternative configurations.

Eastern and Trans-Caspian segments drive the index

December’s MSRI growth was increasingly shaped by eastern and Middle Corridor segments, with contributions spread across several macro-regions. The China Border–Caspian Sea corridor was the single largest contributor, accounting for 25.5% of the index movement, supported by firmer transit pricing and year-end activity.

Black Sea–Central Europe remained an important stabilising segment at 21.2%, although its influence was less dominant than in November. Strong upstream momentum was also visible on the Xi’an–China Border leg, which contributed 20.8%, reflecting resilient outbound rail flows from inland China.

Additional support came from Caspian Sea segments (16.8%), the South Caucasus (7.7%) and the Black Sea (6.9%), while domestic Chinese legs around Xi’an remained broadly neutral. Overall, the structure of the index in December was more balanced and east-weighted, pointing to a wider distribution of cost drivers heading into early 2026.

Deep-sea rates dominate Suez Canal index rise

The MSCI increased more sharply than the rail index in December, rising by 5.01% for 20-foot containers and by 5.64% for 40-foot units. Maxmodal attributes 90.6% of this monthly increase to the deep-sea leg on Asia–North Europe routes.

Europe on-carriage contributed 5.8% to the MSCI increase, largely due to disruption-driven cost pressure. A full closure of the Elbe Valley rail corridor from 1 to 10 December, restrictions at Rotterdam World Gateway and RSC between 10 and 21 December, and prolonged barge congestion in Antwerp-Bruges and Rotterdam reduced inland capacity and raised effective costs.

China pre-carriage added a further 3.6%, indicating broadly stable upstream pricing conditions rather than a surge in inland demand.

Looking ahead, Maxmodal notes that early January data suggest a potential moderation in index momentum, as deep-sea container rates have started to decline, indicating that December’s narrowing of the rail–sea spread may prove temporary.